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n her Presidential Address to the American Philosophical 
Association's Eastern Division, Linda Alcoff argued that 
philosophical debates ought to be reframed so as to re-
flect the social and political contexts which give rise to 
them if we are to avoid wielding philosophy as an instrument of 
epistemic oppression. In other words, philosophy should not 
consider the theories it produces separate from the material con-
ditions of society. This is an admirable position for Alcoff to take. 
The common view that philosophy is aimed at objective, neces-
sary truths lends itself to justification of oppression. Much of her 
address justifies this position beautifully. 
Alcoff, unfortunately, goes wrong when she argues that it is 
problematic that “...our truth is universal rather than contex-
tual...” (Alcoff, 2013). The problem is not that she criticizes uni-
versal truths, but that she positively advances the position that 
truth is contextual in a social sense. This form of contextualism is 
derived from a problematic naturalism that advocates a form of 
scientific pluralism. I will argue that Alcoff’s position emerges 
from a misunderstanding of the role that the term “truth” plays 
within our language. It will be demonstrated that her conception 
of truth abstracts the term from its use as a predicate in ordinary 
speech and turns it into an object for philosophical investigation. 
Further, an analysis of the ordinary uses of “truth” supports Al-
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coff's fight against oppression better than a contextual under-




The contextualism that Alcoff advances is distinct from the 
more common epistemic contextualism that philosophers such 
as Keith DeRose argue for. While DeRose defines contextualism 
as the claim that “what ordinary speakers will count as 
'knowledge' in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny 
is such in others” (DeRose, 2006), Alcoff defines contextualism in 
terms of the social context in which philosophy takes place. The 
former sort of contextualism deals with variation in what counts 
as knowledge based on the needs of a given situation, while the 
latter deals with social context in a broader sense. 
What this means for truth, in Alcoff's view, is that “truth [is] 
something constructed rather than discovered intact. Thus truth 
is essentially historical and essentially contingent, and it is not 
simply that our claims to truth must be historically contextual-
ized. There is no truth (even an inaccessible truth) which is uni-
versal, abstract or independent of the scientific process” (Alcoff, 
1987). Hence, in her view truth is part of a greater historical 
process and does not constitute an immutable form, but a contin-
gency. Truth, as it were, cannot be separated from the place of 
the object of study or the social context in which the truth claims 
are made. 
Alcoff's form of contextualism is best understood in terms of 
her understanding of why philosophers are wrong about truth. 
She correctly notes that conceptions of objective truth can be 
used as a method of oppression by being used to reject political 
dissent and to disregard the experiences of oppressed individu-
als. Her response to this position is to accept that what is true 
depends on the context in which the truth claim is made. Thus, 
what is true for one group of people is not true for another. 
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A History of Alcoff's Naturalism 
 
Alcoff's form of naturalism was deeply influenced by the 
work of Willard van Orman Quine. In the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, Quine developed naturalism as a reaction to the logical 
positivists. To his thinking, the logical positivists' adherence to 
both empiricism and analytic statements was problematic. The 
cure for Quine was a rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion and a naturalization of epistemology. By rejecting the ana-
lytic-synthetic distinction, Quine advanced a stricter empiricism 
than the logical positivists and was able to assert that there is no 
clear distinction between philosophy and science. (Quine, 1951) 
Further, by naturalizing epistemology, Quine made it the work 
of philosophy to engage scientifically with the “problem of 
bridging a gap between sense data and bodies,” (Quine, 1973). 
On this view, whatever science's aim is, it is the aim of philoso-
phy also. 
It is in light of this that the philosophical works of Helen 
Longino, one of Alcoff’s predecessors, make sense. She advocates 
an epistemology that is continuous with science. Longino modi-
fies Quine's naturalism, giving a more complex view of scientific 
practice. Instead of unitary view of science, Longino advances a 
pluralistic conception of scientific practice (Kellert et al, 2006). 
What this means is that Longino accepts that science advances 
by using multiple frameworks that explain various phenomena 
in different ways. These frameworks are determined within a 
social context. What this means for philosophy is that, since it is 
continuous with science, all philosophical notions must be un-
derstood within a given context. Hence, Longino asserts a con-
textual empiricism that does not support universalist notions of 
objectivity (Alcoff, 2013). Rather, Longino accepts that there are 
multiple frameworks that give valid interpretations of reality 
and there are no good epistemic reasons to prefer one over the 
other. 
Like Longino, Alcoff supports a local understanding of sci-
ence. It is within a given context that scientific conclusions can be 
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understood and, as such, philosophy must be understood in 
terms of its socio-historical place as well. However if, as I sug-
gest, this view of true knowledge doesn’t accord with common 
sense, then the question that we must ask is which philosophical 
framework ought to be preferred, naturalism or ordinary lan-
guage? 
 
Naturalism Contra-Ordinary Language 
 
To present an ordinary language critique of Alcoff's attempt 
to make truth contextual, the preference for a Wittgensteinian 
analysis over a naturalistic one must be substantiated. Wittgen-
stein's philosophy has been out of fashion since the late twenti-
eth century. A complete survey of reasons why philosophers 
have rejected Wittgenstein is beyond the scope of this paper.1 
We shall only treat two objections: the continuity between sci-
ence and philosophy, and Wittgenstein's supposed conserva-
tism. 
Wittgenstein's philosophical works share some common 
ground with naturalism, but these are only surface similarities. 
The main similarity is a context-dependent understanding of lin-
guistic meaning. Beyond this, however, Wittgenstein and natu-
ralism stand far from one another. In the course of explaining 
Wittgenstein's account of language and his philosophical 
method, the extent of their differences will become manifest. 
Philosophical Investigations begins by presenting a conception 
of language that Wittgenstein wished to oppose with his new 
theory. According to this conception language is comprised of 
terms and these terms refer to objects. When written out, this 
view seems strange, but it is the very concept of language phi-
losophers have used throughout the history of philosophy. Dis-
proving this conception of philosophy is fairly straight forward. 
Wittgenstein does this through a thought experiment involving a 
very basic language that consists of object terms and pointing. 
Once one begins to add numbers, verbs, and other parts of 
speech which have no clear object related to them to this lan-
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guage a pointing strategy quickly proves inadequate. There are 
no objects to point at.2 
In contrast to this, the traditional portrait of language, Witt-
genstein portrays language as diverse and dynamic. Words have 
meaning not by being related to objects, but by their use in lan-
guage. This is where words obtain their initial significance. They 
are brought about by social discourse, by individual interactions. 
It is from the contrast between his and the traditional theories of 
language that Wittgenstein derives his understanding of the ori-
gin of philosophical problems. 
Philosophical problems arise when it seems linguistically 
that we are referring to an object, but there is not one. To com-
pensate for objects they cannot find, philosophers then create an 
“object” beyond the senses that can be found only by deep con-
templation. This is most easily demonstrated by Plato’s works. In 
the Platonic dialogues, Socrates questions his fellow Athenians 
about the meanings of terms like “courage” and “justice” while 
expecting to find a referent for them. He eventually went so far 
as to posit objects accessible only to philosophers called the 
“Forms” which relate to each of those terms. The history of phi-
losophy is the history of reiterations of this misconception. 
This is similar to the position of the naturalists because it rec-
ognizes that philosophy has, in some sense, constructed its 
knowledge. The difference is that naturalism commits the same 
error as traditional philosophies by failing to account for the dis-
tinction between speaking about the conceptual and speaking 
about the empirical. By rejecting that distinction, naturalism 
treats concepts as though they were objects. 
The way in which positing that philosophy and science are 
continuous forces naturalists to treat concepts as though they 
were objects is that treating these concepts as scientific entails the 
assumption that they can be handled in the way that objects are. 
Science studies objects through empirical means. Making phi-
losophy continuous with science requires philosophers to inves-
tigate philosophical issues through empirical means. They must 
search for natural facts to gather in support of their arguments. 
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Hence, given a naturalistic epistemological stance, philosophical 
concepts must refer to objects. 
The problem with this is that concepts are not the sorts of 
things that are given to empirical investigation. For example, in 
order to determine if there is a married bachelor, one does not 
engage in empirical investigation of all bachelors to see if there is 
a married bachelor. If one is confused about this issue the correct 
way to deal with this is to remind them that a bachelor cannot be 
married by definition. 
This sort of argument is what Quine attempted to end when 
he rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction. Quine's actual ar-
gument is unimportant here. What is important is that Quine 
never responded to Grice and Strawson (1956), or Carnap’s 
(1963) criticisms, which casts doubt upon his conclusions. Fur-
ther, Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction does 
not necessitate that “there is not distinction between between a 
priori and empirical propositions” (Hacker, 2006). This is demon-
strable by way of mathematics. Even if mathematics is empiri-
cally grounded, it is clear that, at a minimum, not all mathemati-
cal propositions can be disproved by empirical investigation. 
Both of these points indicate that there is a difference be-
tween science and philosophy. Also, given that treating philoso-
phy as continuous with science forces philosophy to treat con-
cepts as though they were objects, it makes the link between the 
two undesirable even to the naturalist. The naturalist could mis-
represent many of our concepts and the way we use them by at-
taching them to false referents. Thus, it seems clear that philoso-
phy deals with conceptual issues, while science deals with em-
pirical issues. 
What this means then is that naturalism provides a false 
view of philosophical issues. Naturalism's scientism unintention-
ally creates objects where it finds concepts. It attempts to find 
ways to scientifically investigate what is best understood gram-
matically. Wittgenstein gives a conception of philosophy that 
cures these confusions and helps to clarify what it is that con-
fuses us and leads us to ask the right philosophical questions. 
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Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is essentially thera-
peutic. It is the goal of philosophy to disabuse others of their phi-
losophical leanings. This is done by showing them that they have 
been misled by their language to positing nonexistent objects. 
They have produced nonsense. But this is only the destructive 
part of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
The constructive aspects of his philosophy are his clarifica-
tions about various grammatical distinctions. This has both the 
effect of dispelling notions that lead to philosophical confusions. 
This can have an impact on other subjects, which are often con-
ceptually confused. An example of this what special relativity 
did for physics. When Einstein made the breakthrough that 
changed the course of his discipline, he did not do so through 
empirical investigation. Einstein recognized that the way in 
which scientists viewed the concepts of space and time was con-
fused (Isaacson, 2007). By proposing that determinations of 
things like simultaneity depended on point of reference and that, 
as a consequence, space and time were relative, Einstein clarified 
the concepts themselves. By being confused by their grammar, 
physicists were engaging in what had become fruitless scientific 
endeavors. By clearing up the concepts, Einstein opened up new, 
more promising research. 
The continuity between philosophy and science advocated 
by naturalism, if it were true, would constitute a reason to reject 
the work of Wittgenstein. This is due to Wittgenstein's strict ad-
herence to the idea that philosophy deals only with conceptual 
confusions and not with empirical issues. Given the critique 
above, it is clear that Wittgenstein already has the better end of 
the argument. 
Because of his conservatism, Wittgenstein has also been the 
victim of a tradition of misinterpretation. It is often asserted that 
Wittgenstein was a sort of political quietist who did not think 
that philosophy had any role to play at all in political life, so that 
anyone in agreement with his conception of philosophy can do 
nothing to correct epistemic injustices. Even Alcoff claims that 
“Wittgenstein... supplied the most extreme conclusion for this 
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trend of honoring the everyday: philosophy’s ultimate aim, he 
said, is to leave everything just as it is” (Alcoff, 2013). Alcoff is, 
as many others do, referencing §124 of Philosophical Investiga-
tions. There is a strong tradition of simply quoting the middle of 
this paragraph and proclaiming Wittgenstein a quietist. How-
ever, upon examination of the whole paragraph, a different story 
emerges. The full passage is: 
 
Philosophy must not interfere in any way with 
the actual use of language, so it can in the end 
only describe it. For it cannot justify it either. It 
leaves everything as it is. It also leaves mathemat-
ics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can ad-
vance it. (Wittgenstein, 2009) 
 
From the full passage it is clear that Wittgenstein is not 
claiming that philosophy and philosophers must leave the world 
as it is, but that philosophy must leave language as it is. If he 
meant everything, why then would he mention mathematics, 
specifically? 
Further assertions about Wittgenstein’s quietism arise when 
one analyzes biographical evidence. Norman Malcolm, one of 
Wittgenstein students, once related that Wittgenstein had writ-
ten to him in relation to a political discussion “what is the use of 
studying philosophy... if it does not improve your thinking 
about the important questions of everyday life?” (Malcolm, 
1958). What is important here is not the actual subject matter of 
philosophy. It seems clear that social issues are empirical and 
not within the domain of philosophical analysis. What is impor-
tant is the influence that philosophy ought to have on one's 
thinking. Philosophy, then, should allow one to consider social 
problems more clearly due to the careful thinking that philoso-
phical inquiry requires. 
Wittgenstein's work in philosophy provides us with the tools 
needed to understand philosophical concepts and why they are 
confused. This work leads to a rejection of the creation of objects 
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from concepts as it was done by both traditional philosophy and 
through the scientism of the naturalists. This form of philosophi-
cal thinking provides the best manner for understanding truth. 
 
The Meaning of Truth 
 
Philosophical accounts of “truth” tend to be confused, creat-
ing grand theories of what is and what we can know that are 
prone to counter examples. What is the source of these confu-
sions? The answer lies in how the term “true” is used in ordinary 
speech. When most philosophers talk about truth, they treat it as 
the name of an object to be understood by thought alone. What is 
meant by this is that one does not find “truth” in the world by 
empirical investigation, but by intuiting what “truth” must be. 
This is so even in the case of philosophers like Alcoff who think 
truth is contextual. Contextual truth is not spared the error of 
assuming a non-existent object by the understanding that what 
counts as true changes from social context to social context. 
Rather, this understanding of truth is reached by making an as-
sumption about what sort of thing “truth” is, and then determin-
ing that it must change by context. The problem with this is that 
it abstracts the term “truth” from the way in which it is normally 
used and attempts to invent a deeper meaning for it. But words 
only derive their meaning from their function in communication, 
their place in an entire language. By taking the word out of con-
text, philosophers are looking for objects where there aren't any. 
With the thought that philosophers treat truth as the name of an 
object in mind, the question is, does the term “truth” function as 
a name (that is, as a term with such a referent) in ordinary 
speech? 
In J.L. Austin's paper “Truth”, he gave a number of uses of 
“truth” in ordinary language. He takes three propositional forms 
to be the primary uses of “truth”: 
 P1: S is true. 
 P2: It is true that S. 
 P3: Statement S is true. 
Is the Truth Contextual? 
 
24 
The forms that Austin take as primary all reduce to varia-
tions of “S is true”. What is striking about this form is that “true” 
functions as a predicate that applies to whole propositions. This 
result is important in terms of answering if the term “true” can 
function as a name. 
As Gottlob Frege demonstrated, a predicate cannot function 
as a name. While Frege made the mistake of treating “True” and 
“False” as complex names, his analysis of propositions still 
holds. In his analysis, the reason that a predicable cannot be a 
name is because while a name picks out an object in the world, a 
predicable acts as a guide to a property. This is demonstrable by 
the fact that predicables come in contradictory pairs such as “S is 
true” and “S is not true”, while names do not come in such pairs. 
Placing the negative participle in front of a name does not create 
the contradictory of that name, while doing the same to a predi-
cable creates a contradictory pair (Frege, 1970). 
However, the truth predicate is unique in that it applies to 
whole propositions and not just to names. Following Frege, it 
seems reasonably clear that predicables map their subjects onto 
truth-values. In other words, a predicable is something that can 
be true or false of a given name (Geach, 1962). But how does the 
truth predicate do the same for whole propositions? Since a 
predicable is something that can be true or false of a name, then 
it is clear that a truth predicate is either true or false of a whole 
proposition give that the whole proposition is either true or 
false. However, since the whole proposition is already true or 
false, this application of the truth predicate is redundant. In 
other words, applying the truth predicate performs no greater 
task in application to predicates then to emphasize the truth that 
is implicit in the assertion of a proposition. This deflationary un-
derstanding of truth demonstrates that truth predicates cannot 
be used as proper names such as “objective truth” and “their 
truth.” 
 Alcoff has a response to this objection that “philosophers 
may deflate the meaning of truth, and define it by radically dif-
ferent terms, and yet it remains the single most important phi-
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be used as proper names such as “objective truth” and “their 
truth”. 
Alcoff has a response to this objection that “philosophers 
may deflate the meaning of truth, and define it by radically dif-
ferent terms, and yet it remains the single most important phi-
losophical norm by which we understand our discipline” (Alcoff, 
2013). Her point here seems to be that even when we analyze 
“truth” in this manner, we still act as though we have access to 
universal truths that cannot be accessed except through philoso-
phy. This is a fair criticism of analytic philosophy as it is most 
often practiced. Alcoff's mistake is to move from this objection to 
taking an opposing position to universal truths that derives itself 
from the same mistaken use of the truth predicate. The correct 
solution would have been to reject the idea that there is any ob-
ject that truth refers to. 
However, the ordinary uses of truth are more complex than 
given above. While it is clear that the truth predicate cannot be a 
name, this is not clear of other uses of “truth” without first ana-
lyzing them. There is another philosophically interesting use of 
true and that is the abstract noun “truth.” Since we are examin-
ing ordinary uses of terms, the abstract noun “truth” seems to be 
problematic since it seems to directly contradict the above analy-
sis. Thus, we need to look at how this term is used ordinarily and 
what it means with the context of an utterance. 
Let us take the following examples: 
 U1: Tell me the truth. 
 U2: You can't handle the truth! 
 U3: They will never tell us the truth of what happened 
 there. 
At first glance, these uses of “truth” all seem to point to an 
object that is universally “the truth.” This is a misleading picture 
and the source of philosophical confusions. The use of truth in 
the above cases all lend themselves to the same meaning. 
“Truth” in all of the above asserts that there are true propositions 
that agree with reality, with what is the case. It would be a mis-
take to assume that these propositions constitutes “the truth” for 
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the same reasons as enumerated above. However, there is one 
other use of truth that is philosophically interesting that needs to 
be looked at in further detail. 
 
Truth and Scientific Theories 
 
A final use of truth that is of interest because it is not used in 
ordinary language; the scientific use of the term. Naturalistic 
epistemologies tend to focus on science and its relation to truth. 
This has been especially true of Longino, who has written exten-
sively on scientific pluralism. How is this specialized notion of 
truth used in a scientific sense related to the ordinary notion of 
truth? An analysis of naturalism will prove to be useful in an-
swering this question. 
As Longio argues, “the multiplicity of approaches that pres-
ently characterizes many areas of scientific investigation does 
not necessarily constitute a deficiency” (Kellert et al, 2006). This 
understanding of science fits well with the work of Thomas 
Kuhn on the history of scientific progress.3 In both cases, it can 
be seen that different conceptions of scientific practice as socially 
constructed can be correct while having substantial theoretical 
disagreements. Kuhn's famous example is that Ptolemaic astron-
omy and Copernican astronomy both give accurate predictions 
while positing a completely different view of reality (Kuhn, 
1996). Alcoff relies on this understanding of science when she 
criticizes the way that that western cultures’ conviction in the 
universality of scientific knowledge is notable for its refusal to 
accept the science of different cultures (Alcoff, 2013). This sort of 
rejection is a rejection of others’ reasoning, without even at-
tempting to check the validity or the success of their practices. 
Further, certain properties are explicable in the context of 
one framework and not another. For example, the incom-
mensurability of certain aspects of quantum mechanics with 
relativistic cosmology is not easily solved by looking for a unify-
ing theory such as string theory. And even if string theory were 
substantiated, there is no guarantee that it would provide supe-
rior testable hypotheses to the pluralistic understanding of phys-
ics presented before. 
With this understanding of science in mind, an important 
question comes to mind: what role does truth play in scientific 
hypotheses? It is not the same sort of truth that is ordinarily ex-
pressed. This is due to the fact that different scientific theories 
can have similar explanatory value, but one is considered true 
and the other is not. An example of this comes from special rela-
tivity and Lorentz ether theory. Both these theories gave the 
same testable predictions, but Einstein's theory was preferred. 
There was no reason for this beyond simplicity in scientific theo-
ries. This means that to call a scientific theory true is not redun-
dant, but provides new information about the theory. 
This new information is that the scientific theory gives rules 
for understanding the world which are more successful than not. 
Scientific theories do not seem to assert propositions that can be 
true or false, but rules that provide a way to model reality. Thus 
we can see a sense in which truth can be contextual. When one is 
judging the validity of scientific frameworks, one can conclude 
that a given framework is true in a given social context. Ptole-
maic astronomy and Copernican astronomy can both be true in 
the sense that they both provide a model of reality that can pro-
duce accurate predictions for those employing them. 
From this, it can be determined that in an ordinary sense of 
the propositions being true or false, scientific propositions are 
not capable of being either true or false. Scientific propositions 
are rules that model reality. The sort of truth asserted by scien-
tific propositions is not truth in any ordinary or intuitive sense. It 
is a specialized use of the term that is distinct from the other uses 
of the term. 
It is from this analysis that the problem of scientism within 
naturalism becomes manifest. The problem is this, it appears that 
the naturalists take the scientific conception of truth and impose 
it on all uses of the term. This illegitimately extends the scientific 
meaning of truth to ordinary uses, making all truth contextual in 
this same manner. This treats the concept true as though it were 
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an object. The naturalist has engaged in an empirical investiga-
tion as to what counts as true in a scientific sense. Thus, they 
have come to understand the “true” meaning of “true”. Hence, it 
can be seen that they have made the mistakes mentioned above; 
they have created an object where there is none. 
 
Truth and Oppression 
 From this analysis of truth, we have, in a roundabout 
way, come to a solution to the problem of western impositions of 
universalism. If we understand truth not as an object, but as a 
predicable or an assertion that there are true propositions that 
agree with reality, then we need not act as though we are the 
purveyors of capital-T “Truth.” That conception of truth is de-
rived from treating truth as an object. The Wittgensteinian ther-
apy for the problem is to reject that theory. By doing this it is 
possible to completely reject the philosophical notion of “Truth.” 
 However, the wrong way to deal with this issue is to as-
sert the opposing claim. Theories peddling relative truth and 
contextual truth make the same mistake of treating “truth” as an 
object of philosophical study. This understanding of truth is in-
herently oppressive. This is not due to an express desire to op-
press, but due to treating philosophical concepts as super-
sensible objects that are accessible only to the philosopher. Even 
those like Alcoff, who do not accept that contextual truth should 
be understood only by the philosopher (Alcoff, 2013), are impli-
cated in this. It is due to the nature of the philosophical notions 
themselves, and not to the philosopher asserting them, that the 
philosophical notions must create divisions. If the idea is accessi-
ble through thought or intuition alone, then the idea is accessible 
only to those who have the time to focus on refining their 
thought. It is a self-aggrandizing understanding of truth for phi-
losophers to hold.  
 Another reason that these philosophers’ own practices 
are oppressive. This oppression comes out due to the philosophi-
cal requirement that the “vulgar” be lesser. Comments through-
out history have made it clear that most philosophers look down 
on ordinary modes of understanding and speaking, but this has 
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been made even more explicit since the work of Wittgenstein. In 
rejecting Wittgenstein philosophers must also reject the idea that 
ordinary speech is okay. Instead philosophers must look down 
and tell the masses that their method of speech is vague and that 
only by transcending it through thought alone can one under-
stand what “Truth” signifies. 
 Naturalists look as though they do not do this. They 
make no claims to the “Truth” and they do not claim that ordi-
nary speech is completely vague. What they do is much more 
subtle, but is nonetheless oppressive. They take the notion of 
“Truth” and claim it to be false, they then assert the opposite, 
that “truth” is contextual and that their understanding of “truth” 
can lead to dialogue and understanding between frameworks. 
This is their cure for epistemic oppression. The problem with this 
is that it is a false solution. Because it pays heed to others’ situa-
tions but still claims superior apprehension of “truth,” it allows 
philosophers to feel as though they are doing something to treat 
epistemic discrimination without actually treating epistemic dis-
crimination. The only sort of oppressive tendency that talking 
across frameworks is likely to cure is interpersonal prejudices. 
However, the root cause of oppression, the conviction that one’s 
own position is superior, remains the same and the system re-
mains oppressive. 
 What, then, is the result of adopting a Wittgensteinian 
stance on epistemic oppression? The result is concluding that 
philosophy is not the sort of thing that can treat oppression. Inso-
far as philosophy is useful in these areas, it is useful for improv-
ing one's thinking about the issues. As it is traditionally prac-
ticed, however, it is epistemically oppressive in its own right. 
Philosophy in a Wittgensteinian does not claim to be able to cure 
oppression; however, it can claim not to contribute to this op-
pression.  
 It is the role of activists and the revolutionaries to resolve 
issues of oppression. These are the people who can fight condi-
tions that actually exist within a society. It is only from below, 
and not as a gift from above, that oppression can be ended. But 
do not let it be said that philosophers must be apolitical. There is 
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nothing stopping the philosopher from being an activist, also. 
These are not mutually exclusive. The philosopher must merely 
remember that it is not her studies that cure social ills, but those 




Philosophical theories about truth are riddled with confu-
sions. Alcoff's social context theory is no different. While her at-
tempt to understand and deal with epistemic oppression by rec-
ognizing the influence of social contexts upon scientific knowl-
edge is well-conceived, her application of this method to truth 
and other philosophical concepts is mistaken. By analyzing truth 
as it is used in ordinary language, we can move past theories of 
truth fashion less oppressive philosophical stances. It will also 
help us to understand that we must move beyond philosophy to 
right epistemic and other injustices. “The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change 
it” (Marx, 1970). 
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Notes 
1. Besides naturalism’s critiques, the two main reasons to reject 
Wittgenstein's work are presented in Ernest Gellner's critique 
of Wittgenstein’s Words and Things and in Saul Kripke's semi-
nal work Naming and Necessity. Gellner's work, famed for its 
extraordinary incivility and unreliability, has been critiqued 
thoroughly by Uschanov(2006). 
2. Other proofs that not all words refer to objects exist. One by 
Gottlob Frege will be used later in this paper. Other proofs 
can be found in (Geach, 1962) and (Davidson, 2005). 
3. This is true in spite of Longino's critique of aspects of Kuhn's 
work. What is important is the commonality between the 
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